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Abstract. Lindstro¨m theorems characterize logics in terms of model-theoretic conditions
such as Compactness and the Lo¨wenheim-Skolem property. Most existing characterizations
of this kind concern extensions of first-order logic. But on the other hand, many logics
relevant to computer science are fragments or extensions of fragments of first-order logic,
e.g., k-variable logics and various modal logics. Finding Lindstro¨m theorems for these
languages can be on coding arguments that seem to require the full expressive power of
first-order logic.
In this paper, we provide Lindstro¨m theorems for several fragments of first-order logic,
including the k-variable fragments for k > 2, Tarski’s relation algebra, graded modal
logic, and the binary guarded fragment. We use two different proof techniques. One is a
modification of the original Lindstro¨m proof. The other involves the modal concepts of
bisimulation, tree unraveling, and finite depth. Our results also imply semantic preserva-
tion theorems.
1. Introduction
There are many ways to capture the expressive power of a logical language L. For
instance, one can characterize L as being a model-theoretically well behaved fragment of a
richer language L′ (a preservation theorem), or as being maximally expressive while satis-
fying certain model-theoretic properties (a Lindstro¨m theorem). The main contribution of
this paper is a series of Lindstro¨m theorems for fragments of first-order logic. We also show
connections between our Lindstro¨m theorems and preservation theorems.
The original Lindstro¨m theorem for first-order logic, in one of its most widely used
formulations, says the following:
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Figure 1: Fragments of first-order logic
The first-order Lindstro¨m Theorem [13] An extension of first-order logic satisfies Com-
pactness and the Lo¨wenheim-Skolem property if and only if it is no more expressive than
first-order logic.
There are several other versions of the theorem, characterizing first-order logic for
instance in terms of Compactness and invariance for potential isomorphisms (the ’Karp
Property’). Analogues of this result have been obtained for various extensions of first-order
logic. On the other hand, few Lindstro¨m theorems are known for fragments of first-order
logic. One notable example is Van Benthem’s recent Lindstro¨m theorem for modal logic:
The modal Lindstro¨m theorem [24] An extension of basic modal logic satisfies Compact-
ness and Bisimulation Invariance if and only if it is no more expressive than basic modal
logic. 1
We are not aware of a similar characterization for modal logic involving the Lo¨wenheim-
Skolem property. Note that first-order logic itself is a compact proper extension of modal
logic that has the latter property.
Our primary motivation for considering fragments comes from computer science logic.
Many logics relevant to computer science are fragments (or non-FO extensions of fragments)
of first-order logic, for example k-variable logics and various modal logics. Finding Lind-
stro¨m theorems for such languages can be a challenging problem, since most techniques used
in the past to prove Lindstro¨m theorems rely on coding arguments that seem to require the
full expressive power of first-order logic. For a recent survey of Lindstro¨m theorems in a gen-
eral setting, see [10]. Another motivation is that, by widening our domain of study to logics
not necessarily extending first-order logic, we may come to know more about first-order
logic itself.
We follow two global lines of attack. First, we take the original Lindstro¨m theorem
for first-order logic and generalize the proof as much as possible. In this way, we obtain
Lindstro¨m theorems for the finite variable fragments FOk with k > 2 and Tarski’s relation
algebra. Next, we take the modal Lindstro¨m theorem as a starting point, and try to
generalize it to richer languages. In this way, we obtain Lindstro¨m theorems for graded
modal logic (on arbitrary Kripke structures and on trees) and the binary guarded fragment.
Many open questions remain. For example, we have not been able to find Lindstro¨m
theorems for the two-variable fragment or the full guarded fragment.
1By extensions of basic modal logic we mean language extensions, not axiomatic extensions.
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2. From first-order logic downwards
In this first part, we take the classic Lindstro¨m theorem as a starting point, and we
show that the proof generalizes to certain fragments of first-order logic.
2.1. A strengthening of the Lindstro¨m theorem for first-order logic over binary
vocabularies. The first-order Lindstro¨m theorem uniquely characterizes first-order logic
in terms of Compactness and the Lo¨wenheim-Skolem property within the class of all its
extensions. As we will show in this section, this result can be improved: first-order logic
can be characterized in terms of Compactness and the Lo¨wenheim-Skolem property within
the class of all extensions of the three-variable fragment FO3, if we consider vocabularies
consisting only of unary and binary relation symbols. The proof is not substantially more
difficult than that of the original Lindstro¨m theorem, requiring mainly some extra care with
coding partial isomorphisms and back-and-forth behaviour. But this simple strengthening
will allow us to obtain a number of new results on Tarski’s relation algebra, as well as finite
variable fragments.
To keep things simple, we will work with a fixed relational signature consisting of a set
of unary relation symbols and a set of binary relation symbols, both countably infinite.
By an abstract logic we mean a pair L = (FmlL, |=L), where FmlL is the set of sentences
of L and |=L is a binary truth relation between L-sentences and models. If no confusion
arises, we will sometimes write L for FmlL and |= for |=L. We assume that L-sentences are
preserved under isomorphisms, and that L has the following properties:
◮ closure under Boolean connectives: for every φ ∈ L there is a sentence ψ ∈ L expressing
its negation (i.e., for all models M , M |= ψ iff M 6|= φ), and for every φ,ψ ∈ L there is a
sentence χ ∈ L expressing the conjunction of φ and ψ.
◮ closure under renamings: for every mapping ρ sending relation symbols to relation sym-
bols of the same arity, and for every sentence φ ∈ L, there is a sentence ψ ∈ L such that
for all models M , M |= ψ iff ρ(M) |= φ.
◮ closure under relativisation by unary predicates: for every sentence φ ∈ L and unary
relation symbol P , there is a sentence ψ ∈ L such that for all models M , M |= ψ iff
MP |= φ, with MP the submodel of M induced by the subset defined by P .
Examples of abstract logics in this sense include first-order logic (FO) and its k-variable
fragments (FOk), with k ≥ 1.
Given two abstract logics, L and L′, we say that L extends L′ (or, L′ is contained in
L, denoted by L′ ⊆ L), if there is a map f : FmlL′ → FmlL preserving truth in the sense
that, for all models M and sentences φ ∈ L′, M |=L′ φ iff M |=L f(φ).
An abstract logic L has Compactness if for every set of L-formulas Σ, if every finite
subset of Σ is satisfiable then the entire set Σ is satisfiable. An abstract logic L has the
Lo¨wenheim-Skolem property if every satisfiable set of L-formulas has a countable model.
First, we show that each compact extension of FO (in fact, already of FO2) has the
“finite occurrence property”.
Lemma 2.1 (Finite occurrence property). Let L be any abstract logic extending FO2 that
has Compactness. Then for any φ ∈ L there is a finite set of relation symbols REL(φ) such
that the truth of φ in any model is independent of the denotation of relation symbols outside
REL(φ).
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Figure 2: Model from the proof of Lemma 2.2.
Proof. A standard argument, cf. [8]: since our vocabulary contains infinitely many unary
and binary relation symbols, there are renamings ρ1, ρ2 whose range is disjoint. Take any φ ∈
L, and let φ1, φ2 be its renamings according to ρ1 and ρ2. Let Σ = {∀x1 . . . xk(ρ1(R)(x1 . . . xk)↔
ρ2(R)(x1 . . . xk)) | R a k-ary relation symbol}. Then Σ |= φ1 ↔ φ2, and hence, by Com-
pactness, a finite subset Σ′ ⊆ Σ implies φ1 ↔ φ2. We can pick for REL(φ) the relation
symbols occurring in Σ′. Note that, in case of binary vocabularies, all formulas in Σ belong
to FO2.
The key to the proof of our improved Lindstro¨m theorem is the following observation:
Lemma 2.2. Let L be any abstract logic with the Lo¨wenheim-Skolem property and the Finite
Occurrence Property, such that L extends FO3 and is not contained in FO. Then “L can
relatively projectively define finiteness”: there is a formula ψ ∈ L with a unary predicate N
such that, for each n ∈ N, there is a model of ψ with exactly n elements satisfying N , while
no model of ψ has infinitely many elements satisfying N .
Proof. The basic idea is the same as in traditional proofs of the Lindstro¨m theorem (e.g.,
[8]). Our main contribution is to show that, in the case of binary vocabularies, the coding
argument requires only three variables.
Take any φ ∈ L not belonging to FO. Then for each k ∈ N, there are models Ak |= φ
and Bk 6|= φ that are potentially isomorphic up to back-and-forth depth k. At the same
time, no potentially isomorphic models can disagree on the sentence φ. We can describe
this situation inside L. The construction is outlined in Figure 2.
The model depicted in Figure 2 describes two models, connected via a collection of
partial isomorphisms, that disagree on the sentence φ. The most important feature is that,
if N is an infinite set, then the collection of partial isomorphisms constitutes a potential
isomorphism, whereas if N is finite (say, of size k), the collection of partial isomorphisms
constitutes a potential isomorphism up to back-and-forth depth k.
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More precisely, A and B are unary predicates defining the domains of two (sub)models,
P is a unary predicate whose elements denote pairs from A×B, and the elements of F rep-
resent partial isomorphisms (i.e., sets of pairs constituting structure preserving bijections).
The arrows represent a binary relation R. For instance, in the given example, f represents
the partial isomorphism {(a1, b1), (a2, b2)}, and g represents the partial isomorphism that
extends f with the pair (a3, b3). The elements of the linearly ordered set N will be used to
associate a finite index to each partial isomorphism.
Claim: Each of the following properties of this model can be expressed by a sentence of L:
(1) Every p ∈ P is associated to a pair from A×B.
(2) Every f ∈ F is associated to a set of elements of P that form a partial bijection between
A and B.
(3) Each such partial bijection preserves structure on the submodels defined by A and B,
as far as the finitely many relations occurring in φ are concerned (recall that L has the
Finite Occurrence Property).
(4) Every f ∈ F has an associated ‘index’ from N .
(5) N is linearly ordered by R, such that there is a minimal element, and each non-maximal
element has an immediate successor (in particular, if N is infinite, then it contains an
infinite ascending chain).
(6) If fRg for f, g ∈ F , this means that g extends f (as a partial bijection), and that the
index of g is the successor of the index of f .
(7) The back-and-forth properties hold for partial isomorphisms whose index is not the
maximal element of N .
(8) Some f ∈ F has as its index the minimal element of N .
(9) The submodels defined by A and B disagree on φ. (Recall that L is closed under the
Boolean connectives and relativisation by unary predicates).
Proof of claim: The first eight properties can already be expressed in FO3 by a clever re-
use of variables, and the ninth property can be expressed in L by closure under the Boolean
connectives and relativisation by unary predicates.
For instance, the third property can be expressed as the conjunction of all FO3-formulas
of the following forms, where S ∈ REL(φ) is a binary relation symbol, and Q ∈ REL(φ) is
a unary relation symbol:
∀xy
(
Px ∧ Py ∧ ∃z(Fz ∧Rzx ∧Rzy)→
(
∃z(Rxz ∧Az ∧ ∃x(Ryx ∧Ax ∧ Szx))
↔ ∃z(Rxz ∧Bz ∧ ∃x(Ryx ∧Bx ∧ Szx))
))
and
∀x
(
Px→
(
∃z(Rxz ∧Az ∧Qz)↔ ∃z(Rxz ∧Bz ∧Qz)
))
Note that we crucially use the fact that the signature consists of unary and binary relations
only.
Let χ be the conjunction of all these L-sentences. By the above assumptions, χ has
models in which N has arbitrarily large finite cardinality (this follows from the existence,
for each k ∈ N, of models disagreeing on φ that are potentially isomorphic up to back-and-
forth depth k). However, there is no model of χ in which N is an infinite set. For, suppose
there were. Let θ be a formula expressing that a fresh binary relation symbol S denotes a
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linear order without maximal element on the set denoted by N , thus forcing N to denote an
infinite set. Then χ∧θ would also be satisfiable, hence, by the Lo¨wenheim-Skolem property,
it would have a countable model. In other words, χ would have a countable model in which
N denotes an infinite set. In countable models, being potentially isomorphic means being
isomorphic; thus, there would be isomorphic models disagreeing on φ, which contradicts L’s
invariance for isomorphisms.
In other words, χ relatively projectively defines finiteness.
Theorem 2.3. An abstract logic extending FO3 is contained in FO iff it satisfies both
Compactness and the Lo¨wenheim-Skolem property.
Proof. If an abstract logic is contained in FO, then, clearly, it satisfies Compactness and the
Lo¨wenheim-Skolem property. If, on the other hand, an abstract logic L extends FO3 but
is not contained in FO, then it must lack either the Lo¨wenheim-Skolem property or Com-
pactness. For, suppose that L satisfies the Lo¨wenheim-Skolem property and Compactness.
Let ψ(N) be any L-sentence projectively defining finiteness (cf. Lemma 2.2), and for each
k ∈ N, let χk be an FO
3-formula expressing that there are at least k distinct N -elements
(by reusing bound variables as in ∃x(Nx ∧ ∃y(Ny ∧ Rxy ∧ ∃x(Nx ∧ Ryx ∧ · · · )))). Then
every finite subset of {χk | k ∈ N}∪ {ψ(N)} has a model while the entire set has no model.
This contradicts the Compactness property.
The following results can be proved in a similar fashion:
Theorem 2.4. An abstract logic extending FO3 is contained in FO iff it satisfies Com-
pactness and invariance for potential isomorphisms.
Proof sketch. An analogue of Lemma 2.2 can be proved where the Lo¨wenheim-Skolem prop-
erty is replaced by invariance for potential isomorphisms. Indeed, the proof is even shorter
than the proof of Lemma 2.2 itself, as the last step can be dropped. Given this, we can
proceed just as in the proof of Theorem 2.3.
Theorem 2.5. A concrete abstract logic extending FO3 is contained in FO iff it satisfies
the Lo¨wenheim-Skolem property and the Finite Occurrence Property, and is recursively
enumerable for validity.
Here, by “concrete” we mean that formulas can be coded as finite strings over some
alphabet, in such a way that negation, conjunction, and relativisation are computable op-
erations, and there is a computable translation from FO3-formulas to formulas of the logic.
Theorem 2.5 follows from Lemma 2.2 by closure under relativisation and the fact that
satisfiability of FO3 formulas on finite models is undecidable [6], hence not recursively
enumerable.
Note that these results all rely on our restriction to at most binary relation symbols.
In the case with at most k-ary relations (k ≥ 1), analogous results hold for FOk+1. For the
case of k = 1, the argument is slightly different. For the sake of completeness, we give an
outline of it below (similarly, analogues of Theorems 2.4 and 2.5 can be shown for k = 1).
See also the Lindstro¨m theorem for monadic first-order logic in [21].
Theorem 2.6. Over unary vocabularies, an abstract logic extending FO2 is contained in
FO iff it satisfies both Compactness and the Lo¨wenheim-Skolem property.
Proof sketch. If an abstract logic is contained in FO, then, clearly, it satisfies Compactness
and the Lo¨wenheim-Skolem property. Conversely, let L be any abstract logic extending
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FO2 that is not contained in FO. Let φ ∈ L be non-first-order, i.e., for every k ≥ 0, there
are models M,N disagreeing on φ such that M and N are potentially isomorphic up to
depth k.
By the same argument as in Lemma 2.1, we have that φ depends only on finitely
many (unary) predicates P1, . . . , Pn. Moreover, it can be easily seen that two structures are
potentially isomorphic up to depth k for P1, . . . , Pn if and only if for each unary type τ ,
either τ is realized the same number of times in the two structures, or in both structures τ
is realized at least k times. By a unary type we mean here a function mapping P1, . . . , Pn
to truth values. Similarly, two structures are potentially isomorphic (for unbounded depth)
for P1, . . . , Pn if and only if for each unary type τ , either τ is realized the same number of
times in the two structures, or in both structures τ is realized infinitely many times.
Now, pick fresh unary predicates Q, Q¯ and infinitely many fresh unary predicates Pτi, for
τ a type and i ≥ 1. The unary predicates Q, Q¯ will be used to define two submodels, which
will disagree on φ, and the unary predicate Pτi will be used to code a potential isomorphism.
As we pointed out already, in order to test for the existence of a potential isomorphism it
is enough to count the number of times each unary type is realized. The predicate Pτi,
intuitively, will denote the i-th element of type τ in one of the two substructures, and they
are used to compare the cardinalities between the two substructures. More specifically,
consider the infinite theory Σ containing the following FO2-sentences:
φQ ∧ ¬φQ¯ ∧ ∀x(Q¯x↔ ¬Qx)
∀x(Pτi(x)→ τ(x))
∀x(Pτi(x)→ ¬Pτj(x)) for i 6= j
∀xy(Qx ∧ Pτix ∧Qy ∧ Pτiy → x = y)
∀xy(¬Qx ∧ Pτix ∧ ¬Qy ∧ Pτiy → x = y)
∃x.(Qx ∧ Pτ(i+1)x)→ ∃x.(Qx ∧ x.Pτix)
∃x.(¬Qx ∧ Pτ(i+1)x)→ ∃x.(¬Qx ∧ Pτix)
∃x(Qx ∧ Px ∧
∧
1≤k<i ¬Pτkx)→ ∃x.(Qx ∧ Pτix)
∃x(¬Qx ∧ Px ∧
∧
1≤k<i ¬Pτkx)→ ∃x.(¬Qx ∧ Pτix)
∃x(Qx ∧ Pτix)↔ ∃x(¬Qx ∧ Pτix)
for τ any type and i, j ≥ 1, and where τ(x) is shorthand for
∧
τ(P )=1 P (x)∧
∧
τ(P )=0 ¬P (x).
The first sentence expresses that the two substructures disagree on φ. The instances of the
2nd – 9th sentence above force the following: for all types τ and natural numbers i > 0,
a substructure (induced by Q or by ¬Q) contains an element satisfying Pτi if and only if
it contains at least i elements of type τ . The instances of the last sentence above, finally,
compare the cardinalities between the two structures. It follows that the theory Σ describes
models in which the submodels induced by Q and ¬Q disagree on φ and are potentially
isomorphic.
Incidentally, note that if there are infinitely many elements of type τ , the theory Σ
cannot force each to satisfy some predicate Pτi (as can be seen by an omitting types argu-
ment), but it does force there to be infinitely many elements satisfying some predicate Pτi,
which suffices for present purposes.
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Since, for every k ≥ 0, there are models disagreeing on φ such that the two are poten-
tially isomorphic up to depth k, it can be shown that every finite subset of Σ is satisfiable.
It follows that L cannot have both Compactness and Lo¨wenheim-Skolem, for, the entire
theory Σ would have a countable model, and on countable structures, potential isomor-
phism implies isomorphism.
2.2. First application: Tarski’s relation algebra. Tarski’s relation algebra RA [17]
is an algebraic language in which the terms denote binary relations. It has atomic terms
R,S, . . . ranging over binary relations (over some domain), constants δ and ⊤ denoting the
identity relation and the total relation, and operators ∩,−, •,⌣ for taking the intersection,
complement, composition and converse of relations. Thus, the syntax of RA is:
α ::= R | δ | ⊤ | α ∩ β | α− β | α • β | α⌣
with R an element from some countably infinite set of variables standing for binary relations.
An interpretation for this language is a setX together with an assignment of binary relations
over X to the atomic terms. In other words, it is a first-order structure for the vocabulary
that contains the atomic terms as binary relation symbols. We write α ≡ β if, in each
interpretation, α and β denote the same binary relation, and we write α ⊆ β if, in each
interpretation, α denotes a subrelation of the relation denoted by β.
In this section, we provide a Lindstro¨m-theorem for extensions of relation algebra. By
an extended relation algebra we will mean any language obtained by extending the syntax
of relation algebra with zero or more additional logical operations, where a logical operation
is any operation that takes as input a fixed finite number of binary relations R1, . . . , Rn
(over some set X) and that produces a new binary relation S over the same set. We also
require logical operations to respect isomorphisms, and to be domain independent in the
following sense (familiar from database theory): the output relation S only depends on part
of the domain X that participates in at least one pair belonging to an input relation Ri.
An example of a domain dependent operation is the (unary) absolute complement operator,
while the (binary) relative complement operator is domain independent. Another example
of a domain dependent operator is the zero-ary operator that returns the total relation
in case the domain X is infinite, and the empty relation otherwise. We disallow domain
dependent operations, as they may cause the language to lose closure under relativisation.
Lemma 2.7 (Closure under relativisation). Let L be any extended relation algebra, let α be
any expression of L, and let R be any relation variable. Then there is an expression of L,
which we denote by αdom(R) such that in every interpretation M , the denotation of αdom(R)
in M is the denotation of α in M ′, where M ′ is the submodel of M induced by the domain
of RM .
Proof. First, note that the expression ⊤R := R • ⊤ •R
⌣ denote the total relation over the
domain of R. Now, αdom(R) is obtained by uniformly replacing every atomic expression α
(i.e., the relational variables, as well as ⊤ and δ) by α ∩ ⊤R. A straightforward formula
induction shows that αdom(R) satisfies the required conditions. The inductive step for com-
plex expressions uses the fact that all operations of L are domain independent.
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One example of an extended relation algebra, RAFO, is the extension of relation algebra
with all first-order definable logical operations (see e.g. [25]). Another example is RAT , the
extension of relation algebra with the transitive closure operation [15].
The Compactness and Lo¨wenheim-Skolem properties can be defined for extended rela-
tion algebras as usual. For instance, we say that an extended relation algebra L has the
Lo¨wenheim-Skolem property if for every set of L-expressions Φ, if there is an interpreta-
tion under which
⋂
Φ is a non-empty relation, then there is such an interpretation over a
countable domain. As is not hard to see, RA and RAFO satisfy both Compactness and the
Lo¨wenheim-Skolem property, whereas RAT satisfies the Lo¨wenheim-Skolem property but
lacks Compactness.
The following Lindstro¨m-style theorem shows that all extended relation algebras con-
taining non-first-order definable operations lack either Compactness or the Lo¨wenheim-
Skolem property.
Theorem 2.8. Let L be any extended relation algebra with the Compactness and Lo¨wenheim-
Skolem properties. Then every logical operation of L is first-order definable.
Proof. Lemma 2.2 can be adapted to the relation algebra setting, allowing us to show
that every extended relation algebra containing a non-elementary logical operation and
having the Lo¨wenheim-Skolem property can projectively define finiteness, and hence lacks
Compactness. We will not spell out the details, but merely mention the following key points
of the proof:
◮ For every first-order sentence φ containing only three variables, in a signature consisting
only of binary relations, there is a relation algebra expression α such that for every model
M , M |= φ iff α ≡ ⊤ holds in M [17].
◮ Unary relations can be mimicked by binary relations by systematically intersecting them
with the identity relation.
◮ In this way, every extended relation algebra gives rise to an abstract logic extending FO3.
Closure under relativisation of the logic is guaranteed by the domain independence of the
logical operations of L.
In other words, the extension of relation algebra with all elementary operations (a
well-known structure in algebraic logic) is the greatest extension that satisfies Lo¨wenheim-
Skolem and Compactness. The same holds if we replace the Lo¨wenheim-Skolem property
by invariance for potential isomorphisms, or if we replace Compactness by recursive enu-
merability.
Theorem 2.8 nicely complements a known result: every extended relation algebra with
Craig interpolation can define all first-order definable operations [18]. Together, these results
show that RAFO is the unique (up to expressive equivalence) extension of RA satisfying
Compactness, Lo¨wenheim-Skolem, and Craig Interpolation.
2.3. Second application: finite variable fragments. In this section, we provide Lind-
stro¨m theorems for the finite variable fragments FOk with k > 3, over vocabularies con-
sisting of unary and binary relation symbols only. It is well known that the finite variable
fragments can be characterized as fragments of first-order logic using potential isomorphisms
with a restricted number of pebbles:
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Definition 2.9. (k-pebble potential isomorphisms) A k-pebble potential isomophism
between M and N is a non-empty family F of finite partial isomorphisms f between M
and N with |dom(f)| ≤ k satisfying the following properties:
◮ Closure under restrictions: for all f ∈ F and f ′ ⊆ f , also f ′ ∈ F .
◮ Forth: for all {(w1, v1), . . . , (wn, vn)} ∈ F with n < k, and w ∈ M , there is an v ∈ N
such that {(w1, v1), . . . , (wn, vn), (w, v)} ∈ F
◮ Back: for all {(w1, v1), . . . , (wn, vn)} ∈ F with n < k, and v ∈ N , there is an w ∈ M
such that {(w1, v1), . . . , (wn, vn), (w, v)} ∈ F
Fact 2.10. FOk is (up to logical equivalence) the fragment of FO invariant for k-pebble
potential isomorphisms (k ≥ 1).
For a proof of Fact 2.10 see for instance [1].
Using Lemma 2.2, we can turn this into the following Lindstro¨m characterization (re-
member that we only consider unary and binary relation symbols):
Theorem 2.11 (Lindstro¨m theorem for FOk). Let k ≥ 3. An abstract logic extending FOk
satisfies Compactness and invariance for k-pebble potential isomorphisms iff it is no more
expressive than FOk.
Proof. Consider any abstract logic L extending FO3 that has Compactness and is invariant
for k-pebble potential isomorphisms. Then in particular it is invariant for potential isomor-
phisms, and therefore by Theorem 2.4 it must be contained in FO. But then, by Fact 2.10,
it must be contained in FOk.
Theorem 2.11 can also be seen as a strengthening of the classical preservation result
in Fact 2.10 (for k ≥ 3, and on binary vocabularies). Indeed, it implies (and in fact is
equivalent to, as we will explain) the following “generalized preservation theorem”:
Corollary 2.12. Let k ≥ 3. Let L be any abstract logic extending FOk with Compactness.
Then FOk is the fragment of L invariant for k-pebble potential isomorphisms (up to logical
equivalence). In particular, FOk is the fragment of FO invariant for k-pebble potential
isomorphisms.
Proof. Let L be any compact abstract logic extending FOk, and let L′ be the fragment
of L invariant for k-pebble potential isomorphisms. Then L′ satisfies all the requirements
of abstract logics. For instance, it is closed under relativisation: if φ ∈ L is invariant for
k-pebble potential isomorphisms, then so is its relativisation by a unary predicate. Thus,
L′ is an abstract logic extending FOk that is compact and invariant for k-pebble potential
isomorphisms. Hence, by Theorem 2.11, it is contained in FOk.
In fact, Corollary 2.12 also implies Theorem 2.11: let L be any logic extending FOk sat-
isfying Compactness and invariance for k-pebble potential isomorphisms. By Corollary 2.12,
FOk is the the fragment of L invariant for k-pebble potential isomorphisms. But since L
itself is invariant for k-pebble potential isomorphisms, this means that L and FOk coincide
in terms of expressive power. This shows that Corollary 2.12 and Theorem 2.11 are really
equivalent to each other: Lindstro¨m theorems and preservation theorems sometimes amount
to the same thing.
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3. From modal logic upwards
The approach of generalizing the classic Lindstro¨m theorem only got us so far. It
enabled us to characterize FOk for k ≥ 3 but is unlikely to reach much further down, since
coding power then falls under the minimum needed to describe partial isomorphisms and
their extension properties. Thus, we will now take a different approach, by considering the
modal Lindstro¨m theorem, and trying to generalize it to richer languages. In particular, we
obtain two new Lindstro¨m theorems for the graded modal logic.
3.1. The modal Lindstro¨m theorem revisited. We recall the proof of the modal Lind-
stro¨m theorem of [24] (which improves on an earlier result in [7]). First, we need to define
“abstract modal logics”. As before, we assume a fixed vocabulary, now consisting of a sin-
gle binary relation symbol R and a countably infinite set of unary relation symbols, also
called proposition letters. Structures for this vocabulary are usually called Kripke models
(the restriction to a single binary relation symbol is not essential but is convenient for
presentation). We associate to each formula a class of pairs (M,w), where M is a Kripke
model and w is an element of the domain of M . This is because modal formulas are always
evaluated at a point in a model. We call such pairs (M,w) pointed Kripke models. Thus, an
abstract modal logic is a pair L = (FmlL, |=), where FmlL is the set of formulas of L and
|= is a binary relation between L-formulas and pointed Kripke models. As before, when no
confusion arises, we will write L for FmlL. Also, as before, we assume that L-formulas are
invariant for isomorphisms, and that L is closed under the Boolean operations, renaming,
and relativisation by unary predicates. 2
Examples of abstract modal logics include basic modal logic, its extension with counting
modalities called graded modal logic (GML), first-order logic (by which we mean the col-
lection of all first-order formulas in one free variable, over the appropriate signature), and
the modal µ-calculus. For the syntax and semantics of basic modal logic, see any modal
logic textbook (e.g., [5]).
The modal Lindstro¨m theorem characterizes basic modal logic in terms of Compactness
and invariance for bisimulations. A bisimulation between Kripke models M and N is a
binary relation Z between the domains ofM and N satisfying the following three conditions:
◮Atomic harmony: if wZv then w and v agree on all proposition letters (unary predi-
cates).
◮ Zig: if wZv and wRMw′, there is a v′ such that vRNv′ and w′Zv′.
◮ Zag: if wZv and vRNv′, there is a w′ such that wRMw′ and w′Zv′.
Two pointed Kripke models (M,w) and (N, v) are bisimilar if there is a bisimulation Z
between M and N with wZv. A formula is bisimulation invariant if it does not distinguish
bisimilar pointed Kripke models, and an abstract modal logic is bisimulation invariant if all
its formulas are.
Given a pointed Kripke model (M,w), we denote by Mw the submodel of M contain-
ing all points that are reachable in finitely many steps from w along the binary relation.
Likewise, for k ∈ N, Mkw is the submodel of M containing all points reachable from w in at
2So far, there is nothing particularly ‘modal’ about these systems, and we might also speak of “abstract
local logics”, or some other appealing terminology. In particular, we do not replace isomorphism invariance
by ‘modal’ invariance for bisimulations in the definition of these logics. The power of the latter condition is
precisely one of the things we want to scrutinize in what follows.
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most k steps along the binary relation. We say that a formula φ is invariant for generated
submodels if, for all models M with nodes w, (M,w) |= φ iff (Mw, w) |= φ. We say that
φ has the finite depth property if there is a k ∈ N such that (M,w) |= φ iff (Mkw, w) |= φ,
for all models M with nodes w. Clearly, the latter implies the former. Also, bisimulation
invariance implies invariance for generated submodels, because the natural inclusion map
is a bisimulation. An abstract modal logic L is invariant for generated submodels (or, has
the finite depth property), if every φ ∈ L is invariant for generated submodels (respectively,
has the finite depth property).
We are now ready to proceed with the proof of the modal Lindstro¨m theorem, The-
orem 3.3 below. We first prove a finite occurrence property for compact extensions of
basic modal logic that satisfy invariance for bisimulation (in fact, invariance for generated
submodels will do).
Lemma 3.1 (Finite occurrence property). Let L be any abstract modal logic extending basic
modal logic that is compact and invariant for generated submodels. Then for each φ ∈ L,
there is a finite set of proposition letters PROP (φ) such that the truth of φ in any pointed
Kripke model is independent of the denotation of proposition letters outside PROP (φ).
Proof. Like that of Lemma 2.1. Since the set of proposition letters (unary predicates) is
infinite, we can find renamings ρ1, ρ2 for them whose range is disjoint. Now, take any φ ∈ L,
and let φ1, φ2 be its renamings according to ρ1 and ρ2. Let Σ = {
n(ρ1(p) ↔ ρ2(p)) | n ∈
N and p a proposition letter}, where n stands for a sequence of n boxes. It follows from
generated submodel invariance that Σ |= φ1 ↔ φ2, hence, by Compactness, a finite subset
Σ′ ⊆ Σ implies φ1 ↔ φ2. We can pick for PROP (φ) the set of proposition letters occurring
in Σ′.
Our crucial observation in this Lindstro¨m argument is the following:
Lemma 3.2 ([24]). Let L be any abstract modal logic extending basic modal logic that is
compact and invariant for generated submodels. Then L has the finite depth property.
Proof. Let φ ∈ L, with p a proposition letter not occurring in φ, and let φp be the relativi-
sation of φ by p. By the generated submodel-invariance of L, {p,p,p, . . .} |= φ↔ φp.
By the compactness of L, there is an n ∈ N such that {p,p, . . . ,np} |= φ↔ φp. But this
expresses exactly that φ has the finite depth property, for depth n.
Theorem 3.3 ([24]). An abstract modal logic extending basic modal logic satisfies Com-
pactness and bisimulation invariance iff it is no more expressive than basic modal logic.
Proof. Let L be any abstract modal logic extending basic modal logic and satisfying Com-
pactness and bisimulation invariance. Since bisimulation invariance implies invariance for
generated submodels, L is also invariant for generated submodels. Then, by Lemma 3.1
and Lemma 3.2, it follows that L has the finite occurrence property and the finite depth
property. Next, we use the following well known fact [5]:
Assuming a finite vocabulary, every bisimulation-invariant class of pointed
models with the finite depth property is definable by a formula of basic
modal logic.
We conclude that L is contained in basic modal logic.
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Theorem 3.3 can be seen as a strengthening of van Benthem’s more familiar charac-
terization of basic modal logic as the bisimulation invariant fragment of first-order logic.
Indeed, it implies the latter theorem (as observed in [24]), but something even stronger
holds, viz. the following “generalized preservation theorem”:
Corollary 3.4. Let L be any abstract modal logic extending basic modal logic that has
Compactness. Then basic modal logic is the bisimulation invariant fragment of L (up to
logical equivalence). In particular, basic modal logic is the bisimulation invariant fragment
of first-order logic.
Proof. Let L′ be the bisimulation invariant fragment of L. Then L′ satisfies all criteria
for being an abstract modal logic. For instance it is closed under relativisation: whenever
φ ∈ L is invariant for bisimulations then the relativisation of φ by a unary predicate is also
invariant for bisimulations. Likewise for the Boolean connectives.
Hence, L′ is an abstract modal logic extending basic modal logic and it is bisimulation
invariant and Compact. Hence, it is no more expressive than basic modal logic.
Corollary 3.4 strengthens the traditional bisimulation preservation theorem, as there
are compact extensions of basic modal logic not contained in first-order logic. Indeed:
Theorem 3.5. There is an abstract modal logic extending basic modal logic that is not con-
tained in first-order logic, but still satisfies Compactness, the Lo¨wenheim-Skolem property,
invariance for potential isomorphisms, and Craig interpolation. Moreover, it has a finite
axiomatization and a PSpace-complete satisfiability problem.
The proof is given in the next section. Note that Theorem 3.5 is also interesting for
another reason: it shows that Theorem 2.3 no longer holds when FO3 is replaced by basic
modal logic.
By the same argument as before in the case of finite variable logics, Corollary 3.4
not only follows from Theorem 3.3 but also implies it, and hence the two are equivalent.
Our results resolve a question posed in [24] concerning the relationship between the modal
Lindstro¨m theorem and the ‘classic’ bisimulation preservation theorem.
3.2. A well-behaved non-elementary extension of modal logic. In this section, we
prove Theorem 3.5: we introduce an extension of modal logic, ML•, that is non-elementary
but at the same time is very well behaved (e.g., it has the Compactness and Lo¨wenheim-
Skolem properties). ML• extends basic modal logic with an extra operator •. Thus, the
formulas of ML• are given by:
φ ::= p | ¬φ | φ ∧ ψ | ♦φ | •φ
The semantics of the newly added operator is as follows: M,w |= •φ iff w has infinitely
many reflexive successors satisfying φ (a reflexive node is one related to itself).
The reader may verify that • behaves as any normal modal operator: •(φ ∨ ψ) is
equivalent to •φ ∨ •ψ, and •⊥ is equivalent to ⊥. The dual of • is denoted by •¯.
Proposition 3.6. ML• is a non-elementary abstract modal logic extending basic modal
logic.
Proof. This is an easy verification: e.g., the language is closed under relativisation.
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Proposition 3.7. ML• has the Lo¨wenheim-Skolem property and is invariant for potential
isomorphisms.
Proof. By the containment of ML• in Lω1ω.
Before we proceed to prove the remaining properties of ML•, we will first provide
an alternative semantics for the logic. Let K be the class of all bi-modal Kripke frames
F = (W,R♦, R•) such that R• ⊆ R♦ and for all (w, v) ∈ R•, (v, v) ∈ R♦. Kripke models
based on such frames can be thought of as quasi-models for ML•. The next lemma shows
that they are adequate as such.
Lemma 3.8. For all φ ∈ML•, φ is satisfiable according to the intended semantics iff φ is
satisfiable on the class K.
Proof. In one direction, suppose that M,w |= φ according to the intended semantics, where
M = (W,R, V ) is a uni-modal Kripke model. Define an equivalence relation ∼ on W by
letting v ∼ v′ iff v and v′ assign the same truth value to all subformulas of φ. Let R♦ := R
and R• := {(v, v
′) ∈ R | (v′, v′) ∈ R and there are infinitely many v′′ ∼ v′ such that
(v, v′′) ∈ R and (v′′, v′′) ∈ R}. Then the underlying Kripke frame of M ′ belongs to K,
and a straightforward inductive argument shows that, for all subformulas ψ of φ, and for
all v ∈ W , M,v |= ψ according to the intended semantics iff M ′, v |= ψ. In particular,
M ′, w |= φ. Incidentally, it is important for the above argument that ∼ be an equivalence
relation of finite index, so that the pigeon hole principle can be applied in the inductive
clause for the new modality.
Conversely, let M,w |= φ, whereM = (W,R♦, R•, V ) is a bi-modal Kripke model based
on a frame in K. We will construct a uni-modal model M ′ with a node w′ such that
M ′, w′ |= φ according to the intended semantics. Roughly, the construction of M ′ is based
on the following ideas: (i) make sure that all R♦ \ R•-successors of a node are irreflexive,
by unraveling, and (ii) taking infinitely many copies of each R• successor of each node.
More precisely, as the domain of M ′, we choose W ×N. The accessibility relation R is
the set of all pairs ((v, n), (v′,m)) satisfying one of the following conditions:
− m ≤ 1, m 6= n, and (v, v′) ∈ R♦; or
− m ≥ 2, and (v, v′) ∈ R•.
Observe that, for all v ∈ W , (v, 0) and (v, 1) are R-irreflexive by construction, whereas
(v, n) for n ≥ 2 is R-reflexive or R-irreflexive, depending on v.
Finally, the valuation function V ′ for the atomic propositions is defined as usual, by
letting V ′(p) = {(v, n) | v ∈ V (p)}. Let M ′ = (W × N, R, V ′).
A straightforward inductive argument now shows that, for all formulas ψ, nodes v ∈W
and natural numbers n, M,v |= ψ iff M ′, (v, n) |= ψ according to the intended semantics.
In particular, we see that M ′, (w, 0) |= φ.
In the remainder of this subsection, we use this alternative semantics.
Proposition 3.9. A complete axiomatization for ML• can be obtained by extending any
standard axiomatization for basic (bi-)modal logic with the following axioms:
•φ→ ♦φ and •¯(φ→ ♦φ)
This axiomatization is even strongly complete: each consistent set of formulas is jointly
satisfiable.
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Proof. Both axioms are Sahlqvist formulas, and together, they define the frame class K. It
follows by the Sahlqvist completeness theorem that the axiomatization is strongly complete
for K: every consistent set of formulas is jointly satisfiable in a Kripke model based on a
frame in K.
It follows by Lemma 3.8 that the axiomatization is also sound and strongly complete
with respect to the intended semantics ofML• (the proof of Lemma 3.8 actually shows that
every set of formulas jointly satisfiable on K is jointly satisfiable according to the intended
semantics).
It follows that ML• also satisfies Compactness. We add a few further interesting
properties.
Lemma 3.10. The satisfiability problem for ML• is PSpace-complete.
Proof. The lower bound follows from the PSpace-hardness of basic modal logic. As for the
upper bound, the standard PSpace-algorithm for basic modal logic due to Ladner can be
extended in a straightforward manner to ML• (using the alternative semantics provided by
Lemma 3.8).
Alternatively, one can also perform a direct reduction: for any ML• formula φ, let φ∗
be the uni-modal formula obtained by replacing each subformula of the form •ψ by ♦(r∧ψ),
for r a (fixed) fresh proposition letter. Let Sub(φ) be the set of subformulas of φ, and let
depth(φ) be the modal nesting depth of φ.
It can be shown that, for any φ ∈ML•, φ is satisfiable on K iff
φ∗ ∧
∧
k≤depth(φ)
ψ∈Sub(φ)
k(r ∧ ψ → ♦ψ)
is a satisfiable basic modal formula. Roughly, the idea is that the additional conjuncts in
the above formula guarantee that we can make every r-node reflexive in the model without
affecting the truth of φ. Together with Lemma 3.8 this gives us a polynomial time reduction
from ML•-satisfiability to satisfiability of basic modal formulas.
Proposition 3.11. ML• has the Craig Interpolation property: for all ML•-formulas φ,ψ,
if |= φ → ψ then there is an ML•-formula χ such that |= φ → χ, |= χ → ψ, and all
proposition letters occurring in χ occur both in φ and in ψ.
Proof. This follows from a result in [14], according to which every multi-modal logic ax-
iomatized by Sahlqvist formulas with first-order universal Horn correspondents has Craig
interpolation in the sense described above (note that we do not require the modal operators
occurring in χ to occur both in φ and in ψ). The two axioms from Proposition 3.9 are
precisely of this form.
Note that ML• is not invariant for bisimulations, and it does not have the finite model
property. It would be of interest to characterize the extensions of basic modal logic satis-
fying Compactness and the Finite Model Property. Perhaps this could still lead to some
sort of modal counterpart to the Compactness-Lo¨wenheim-Skolem version of the Lindstro¨m
theorem for first-order logic.
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3.3. Graded modal logic. Graded modal logic (GML) extends basic modal logic with
counting modalities: for each formula φ and natural number k, ♦kφ is admitted as a formula,
and it says that at least k successors of the current node satisfy φ.
GML-formulas are in general not invariant for bisimulations. Still, an important weaker
invariance property does hold: GML formulas are invariant for tree unraveling. A tree model
is a Kripke model whose underlying frame is a tree (in the graph theoretic sense, possibly
infinite, and with a unique root). We will denote tree models by T, T ′, . . ., and we will use
root(T ) to denote the root of the tree model T . Every pointed Kripke model (M,w) can be
unraveled into a tree model, by the following standard construction:
Definition 3.12 (Tree unraveling). Given a Kripke modelM = (W,R, V ) and w ∈W , the
tree unraveling unr(M,w) is defined as (W ′, R′, V ′), where
◮W ′ consists of all finite paths 〈w1, w2, . . . , wn〉 satisfying w1 = w and wiRwi+1.
◮ R′ contains all pairs of sequences of the form (〈w1, . . . , wn〉, 〈w1, . . . , wn, wn+1〉) ∈W
′×W ′
◮ 〈w1, . . . , wn〉 ∈ V
′(p) iff wn ∈ V (p).
It is easily seen that, for any pointed Kripke model (M,w), unr(M,w) is indeed a tree
model, and that 〈w〉 is its root. GML-formulas are invariant for this operation:
Fact 3.13 (GML is invariant for tree unravelings). For all pointed Kripke models (M,w)
and GML-formulas φ, M,w |= φ iff unr(M,w), 〈w〉 |= φ.
The proof is a straightforward formula induction.
We will prove two Lindstro¨m theorem for GML. The first characterizes GML on arbi-
trary structures in terms of Compactness, the Lo¨wenheim-Skolem property and invariance
for tree unravelings. It can be seen as a natural generalization of Theorem 3.3. The second
theorem, which will be proved in the following section, considers GML as a language for
describing nodes in tree models, and it characterizes GML as being maximal with respect
to Compactness and the Lo¨wenheim-Skolem property on such structures.
Theorem 3.3 characterized modal logic in terms of Compactness and bisimulation in-
variance. One might wonder if, likewise, GML can be characterized by Compactness and
invariance for tree unraveling. The answer is negative: the extension of GML with the
modal operator ♦ℵ1 (“uncountably many successors . . . ”) still has these properties (even
first-order logic extended with the “uncountably many” quantifier has (countable) Com-
pactness [9]). Instead, we prove the following:
Theorem 3.14. An abstract modal logic extending GML satisfies invariance for tree un-
ravelings, Compactness, and the Lo¨wenheim-Skolem property iff it is no more expressive
than GML.
As in the case of modal logic, we obtain the following “generalized preservation theorem”
as a corollary (the proof is analogous to that of Corollary 3.4):
Corollary 3.15. Let L be any abstract modal logic extending GML and satisfying Com-
pactness and the Lo¨wenheim-Skolem property. Then GML is the tree unraveling invariant
fragment of L (up to logical equivalence). In particular, GML is the tree unraveling invari-
ant fragment of FO.
The rest of this section is dedicated to the proof of Theorem 3.14. Two easily established
facts about GML will be used in the proof:
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Figure 3: Model from the proof of Lemma 3.18
Fact 3.16 (GML has the finite tree model property). Every satisfiable GML formula is
satisfied at the root of some finite tree model.
Fact 3.17. (GML can describe finite tree models up to isomorphism) Assuming
a finite vocabulary, for every finite tree model T , there is a GML-formula ψT such that for
every tree model T ′, (T ′, root(T ′)) |= ψT iff T
′ ∼= T .
Fix an abstract modal logic L extending GML and satisfying Compactness and Lo¨wen-
heim-Skolem, as well as invariance for tree unravelings. By Lemmas 3.1 and 3.2, L has
the finite occurrence property and the finite depth property (note that invariance for tree
unraveling implies invariance for generated submodels). The following Lemma shows a kind
of “finite width property”:
Lemma 3.18. (Can only count successors up to a finite number) Let L be any
abstract modal logic extending GML and satisfying Compactness, Lo¨wenheim-Skolem, and
invariance for tree unravelings. Then for each formula φ ∈ L and finite tree model T , there
is a natural number k such that “φ can only count T -successors up to k”: whenever a tree
model contains a node v that has k successor subtrees isomorphic to T , then adding more
copies of T will not affect the truth value of φ at the root.
Proof. Since T is a finite tree model, it can be described up to isomorphism by a single
GML-formula ψT . Let Σ be the following set of formulas, where p is a proposition letter
not occurring in φ, and n stands for a sequence of n boxes:
{p, n(¬p→ ¬p) | n ∈ N}
“p defines an initial subtree”
∪ {n(p→ (¬p→ ψT )) | n ∈ N}
“the root of every ¬p-subtree satisfies ψT ”
∪ {n(p ∧ ♦¬p→ ♦m(p ∧ ψT )) | n,m ∈ N}
“every p-node with a ¬p-successor has infinitely many p-successors satisfying ψT ”
Whenever a countable tree model satisfies Σ at the root, the submodel defined by p is
isomorphic to the whole model — isomorphic in the language without p, to be precise (see
Figure 3). Since L satisfies the Lo¨wenheim-Skolem property, invariance for tree unraveling
and invariance for isomorphisms, we can conclude that Σ |= φ ↔ φp. But then, by com-
pactness, there is a k ∈ N such that Σk |= φ ↔ φ
p, where Σk is the following subset of
18 J. VAN BENTHEM, B. TEN CATE, AND J. VA¨A¨NA¨NEN
Σ:
{ p, n(¬p→ ¬p) | n ∈ N }
∪ {n(p→ (¬p→ ψT )) | n ∈ N }
∪ {n(p ∧ ♦¬p→ ♦m(p ∧ ψT )) | n,m ∈ N with m ≤ k }
This shows that the Lemma holds.
Proof of Theorem 3.14. Let L be any abstract modal logic extending GML, satisfying Com-
pactness, the Lo¨wenheim-Skolem property, and tree unraveling invariance. Observe that L
still satisfies Compactness and the Lo¨wenheim-Skolem property if we restrict attention to
trees (the tree unraveling of a countable model is countable). Also, by Lemmas 3.1 and 3.2,
L has the finite occurrence property and the finite depth property (note that invariance for
tree unraveling implies invariance for generated submodels).
Consider any formula φ ∈ L. We will construct a set of equivalence relations ∼φi for
tree models (with i ≥ 0), satisfying the following two properties:
(1) T ∼φi T
′ implies that the truth value of φ at the root of a tree model is not affected if
subtrees isomorphic to T at depth i are replaced by copies of T ′ (or vice versa).
(2) Each ∼φi has only finitely many equivalence classes, and each is definable by a GML-
formula.
This then implies that φ is equivalent to a GML formula (take the disjunction of the
GML-formulas defining the ∼φ0 -equivalence classes that satisfy φ).
The claim holds trivially for i > depth(φ). Next, assume that the claim holds for
i + 1. We will show that it also holds for i. Let K1, . . . ,Kn be the (finitely many) ∼
φ
(i+1)-
equivalence classes, and for each ℓ ≤ n, pick a finite representative Tℓ ∈ Kℓ (using Propo-
sition 3.16). It follows from Lemma 3.18 that there is a k ∈ N such that, for all ℓ ≤ n: “φ
can only count Tℓ-successors up to k”, and hence, by ∼
φ
i+1-equivalence, “φ can only count
Kℓ-successors up to k, at depth i”. But then, it follows that there are at most k
n ·2PROP (φ)
many ∼φi -equivalence classes. Moreover, all these classes are explicitly definable by GML-
formulas (in fact, by Boolean combinations of proposition letters and formulas of the form
♦mψ with m ≤ k and ψ a GML-formula defining some ∼
φ
i+1-equivalence class).
Thus, L is not more expressive than GML on tree models. It follows that L is not more
expressive than GML on arbitrary Kripke models: consider any L-formula φ, and let ψ be
any GML-formula equivalent to φ on tree models. If φ↔ ψ were falsifiable on an arbitrary
model, then, by unraveling, it could be falsified on a tree, which, by assumption, is not the
case. Thus, φ and ψ are equivalent on all Kripke models.
3.4. Graded modal logic on trees. In this section, rather than assuming invariance
for tree unraveling, we consider only tree models from the start. That is, we view GML
as a language for describing nodes of tree models. From this perspective, GML has three
distinctive limiting features: (i) when evaluated in a node, formulas can only see the subtree
starting from that node; (ii) when evaluated at a node, each formula can only look finitely
deeply into the subtree starting at that node; (iii) each formula can only count successors
up to a finite natural number (depending on the largest index occurring in the formula).
Fact 3.19. On trees, GML has the Compactness and Lo¨wenheim-Skolem properties.
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Proof. This follows from the fact that GML has these properties on arbitrary structures
(recall that the tree unraveling of a countable model is still countable).
We will turn this into a Lindstro¨m characterization for GML on trees. However, before
we proceed, two technical issues need to be discussed.
The first concerns closure under relativisation. Recall from Sect. 3.1 that all abstract
modal logics are assumed to satisfy this property. But what does it mean for a logic to
be closed under relativisation if we consider only trees? Note that a submodel of a tree is
not necessarily a tree. We solve this problem as follows. Given a tree model T containing
a node n, and a unary predicate p true at n, we define Subtree(T, n, p) to be the largest
subtree of T that contains n and contains only nodes satisfying p. Note that n is not
necessarily the root of Subtree(T, n, p). We say that an abstract modal logic L is closed
under relativisation on trees, if for every formula φ ∈ L and proposition letter p, there is a
formula ψ ∈ L such that for all pointed tree models (T, n), (T, n) |= ψ iff (T, n) |= p and
(Subtree(T, n, p), n) |= φ. In the case of GML, we can simply pick ψ to be the syntactic
relativisation of φ by p, i.e., the formula obtained from φ ∧ p by replacing all subformulas
of the form ♦nψ by ♦n(p ∧ ψ).
Secondly, we need to make an extra assumption, namely that the extensions L we con-
sider are closed under substitution. Intuitively, this means that L allows us to uniformly
substitute formulas for proposition letters. More precisely, L is closed under substitu-
tion if for all formulas φ,ψ ∈ L and proposition letters p, there is a formula χ such that
for all pointed (tree) models (M,w), (M,w) |= χ iff (M [p 7→{v|(M,v)|=ψ}], w) |= φ, where
M [p 7→{v|(M,v)|=ψ}] is obtained from M by changing the valuation of p to {v | (M,v) |= ψ}. If
we would not assume closure under substitution, there would be proper extensions of GML
with Compactness and Lo¨wenheim-Skolem. Indeed, the extension of GML with formulas of
the form ♦−p (“the current node has a parent that satisfies p”) for p an atomic proposition,
and closed under the Boolean connectives, is an example. This logic is not closed under
substitution, as p may not be replaced by a complex formula in ♦−p.
Theorem 3.20. Let L be an abstract modal logic closed under substitution and extending
GML on trees. L satisfies Compactness and the Lo¨wenheim-Skolem property on trees iff it
is no more expressive than GML on trees.
This is remarkable, since Compactness and Lo¨wenheim-Skolem are also the character-
izing features of first-order logic in the classic Lindstro¨m theorem. Note that first-order
logic lacks Compactness on trees (due to the connectedness of trees).
Now for the proof. Let L be an abstract modal logic satisfying the conditions of
Theorem 3.20. Lemma 3.22 below shows that L-formulas can only look downwards in the
tree.
Lemma 3.21. If L is not invariant for generated submodels, then there is a formula χ ∈ L
containing a unary predicate p such that the following two conditions hold:
(1) for all pointed trees (T, n), (T, n) |= χ implies that n has a parent satisfying p
(2) there is a pointed tree (T, n) satisfying χ in which p is true only at the parent of n.
Proof. Since L is not invariant for generated submodels, there is a formula φ ∈ L and a
pointed tree (T, n) such that (T, n) |= φ and (Tn, n) 6|= φ, or vice versa. Since L is closed
under negation, we may assume w.l.o.g. that the former applies. Moreover, since L is closed
under renamings and the set of proposition letters is infinite, we may assume that there are
20 J. VAN BENTHEM, B. TEN CATE, AND J. VA¨A¨NA¨NEN
infinitely many proposition letters not occurring in φ, in the sense that their interpretation
does not influence truth of φ at any state. We will refer to these proposition letters as being
“fresh”.
Pick two distinct fresh proposition letters p, q, let φp and φq be the relativisations of φ
to p and to q, and let Σ be the following set of L-formulas:
Σ = {φp,¬φq,k(p ∧ q) | k ≥ 0}
Observe that Σ is satisfiable: it is true at (T, n) when we make p true at all nodes, and q
only at n and its descendants. We claim that truth of Σ at a node n in a tree implies that
n has a parent and it satisfies either p or q. For, if not then the submodels Subtree(T, n, p)
and Subtree(T, n, q) would coincide, and hence φp and φq would have to have the same
truth value at n.
Next, we will use Compactness to obtain a finite subset of Σ that implies that the
current node has a parent satisfying p∨ q. First, we ‘redescribe’ the situation encoded by Σ
from the perspective of the parent node. Let Σ′ be the following set of L-formulas, where
r is another fresh proposition letter:
Σ′ = {♦(φp ∧ ¬φq ∧ r),(r → k(p ∧ q)) | k ≥ 0}
By the previous observations, Σ′ |= p ∨ q. Hence, by Compactness, there is a ℓ ∈ N such
that ♦(φp ∧¬φq ∧ r)∧
∧
k≤ℓ(r → 
k(p∧ q)) |= p∨ q. Going back to the perspective of the
node n, if we define ψ to be the formula φp∧¬φq∧
∧
k≤ℓ
k(p∧ q), then ψ is satisfiable, and
it implies the existence of a parent node satisfying p ∨ q. To see this, suppose for the sake
of contradiction that ψ is satisfiable in a pointed tree (T ′, n′) and n′ does not have a parent
satisfying p∨q. There are two cases. If n′ has a parent (satisfying ¬p∧¬q), we immediately
derive a contradiction, by our earlier arguments. If n′ does not have a parent, i.e., is the
root of T ′, we may change the tree by adding a parent above n′ satisfying ¬p∧¬q, without
affecting the truth of ψ at n′, as follows from the definition of ψ and the way we defined
closure under relativisation. Therefore, we obtain again a contradiction.
Finally, we take two more fresh proposition letters, s and t, and we use the fact that L
is closed under substitution: we define χ to be s ∧ ψ[p/(p ∧ (♦s→ t)), q/(q ∧ (♦s→ t))].
On the one hand, truth of χ at a node implies it has a parent satisfying either (p ∧ (♦s→
t)) or (q ∧ (♦s→ t)), and hence t. On the other hand, there is a pointed tree satisfying χ
in which t is only true at the parent node: take (T, n) and extend the valuation by making
s true only at n, and t at its parent.
Lemma 3.22. L is invariant for generated submodels.
Proof. Suppose not. Let χ(p) ∈ L be as described by Lemma 3.21. By a “fresh renaming”
of χ we will mean a copy in which all proposition letters have been renamed to fresh ones,
and which has been relativised by an additional fresh proposition letter. For the reasons
explained in the proof of Lemma 3.21, we may assume that χ(p) has infinitely many fresh
renamings (χi(pi))i∈N.
Finally, we define Σ to be the set of L-formulas {χ1(p1), χ1(χ2(p2)), χ1(χ2(χ3(p3))), . . .}.
Every finite subset of Σ is satisfiable. Indeed, a satisfying model may be constructed by
“overlaying” different copies of the model (T, n) from Lemma 3.21, clause 2. On the other
hand, if a node would satisfy all formulas in Σ at once, its ancestors would form an infinite
ascending chain, which contradicts the well-foundedness property of trees.
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The remainder of the proof of Theorem 3.20 is along the same lines as in Sect. 3.3:
first we prove that L has the finite occurrence, finite depth and finite width properties on
trees (using the fact that it is invariant for generated submodels), and then we derive the
Lindstro¨m theorem by the same argument used in the proof of Theorem 3.14.
3.5. The guarded fragment. The guarded fragment GF forms a second extension of
modal logic, incomparable to graded modal logic. It allows for arbitrary quantifications of
the form ∃~y(G(~x, ~y)∧φ(~x, ~y)), where ~x and ~y are tuples of variables, and the guard G is an
atomic formula containing the variables in ~x and ~y. The guarded fragment is decidable and
has many ‘modal’ meta-properties, due to its invariance for guarded bisimulations [1, 23],
see below for the definition.
Because of its modal character, GF seems an obvious case for a Lindstro¨m-style analysis
like the one we have given for modal logic and graded modal logic. However, there are some
technical difficulties, and we have not been able to prove an analogue of Theorem 3.3 for the
guarded fragment yet. In this section, we focus on a special case, in fact the same special
case as in the first half of the paper, namely for vocabularies with only unary and binary
predicates. The Binary Guarded Fragment (GFbin) has the following syntax:
φ ::= R~x | x = y | ¬φ | φ ∨ ψ | ∃y(G(x, y) ∧ ψ(x, y))
where R is a unary or binary atomic predicate, x and y are distinct variables, the guard G is
an atomic formula containing both x and y (in any order) and ψ contains no free variables
besides (possibly) x and y. Note that, by this definition, unary guards such as Py, Ryy
and y = y are not allowed, and also unguarded quantification over a single remaining free
variable, as in ∃y.φ(y), can no longer be expressed by ∃y.(y = y ∧ φ(y)). Thus, every
GFbin-formula contains at least one free variable. This prohibition on unary guards will be
important, as it implies that the truth of a formula only depends on a local neighborhood
of the elements assigned to the free variables.
GFbin can be seen as an abstract logic contained in FO
2, provided that the definition
of abstract logics is adapted in order to take into account formulas with free variables, in
the natural way. Below, we will assume such a generalized notion of abstract logic. When
interpreted over Kripke models (and considering only formulas with one free variable), the
language GFbin also constitutes an abstract modal logic extending basic modal logic.
Guarded bisimulations admit a natural adaptation to this restricted version of the
guarded fragment, which we call GFbin-bisimulations, defined below.
Theorem 3.23. An abstract logic extending GFbin satisfies Compactness and Invariance
for GFbin-bisimulation iff it is no more expressive than GFbin.
The proof is along the same lines as for modal logic and graded modal logic: using
Compactness, we prove a finite occurrence property and a finite depth property (where
depth is now measured as distance in the ‘Gaifman graph’). We then use a tree-unraveling
argument to show that GFbin can express all properties invariant for guarded bisimulations
and having the finite depth property. It is exactly in this last step that the restriction to
unary and binary relation symbols, as well as the restrictions on the allowed guards, turn
out to be crucial. Roughly, these restrictions allows us to relate distance in the unraveled
tree to Gaifman distance in the original structure.
In the remainder of this section, we present the proof in more detail. We start with
some modal features that hold for GF in general. First, there is a natural syntactic notion
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of formula depth, whose inductive definition counts the above polyadic quantifiers as single
steps:
depth(Px) = 0
depth(¬φ) = depth(φ)
depth(φ ∨ ψ) = max(depth(φ), depth(ψ))
depth(∃~y(G(~x, ~y ∧ φ(~x, ~y))) = depth(φ) + 1
Call a set of elements of M “guarded” if some tuple belonging to some atomic relation
contains all these elements. We define distance for points in models (M,~s), where ~s is a
tuple of nodes, as follows: dist(~s, si, 0) holds for si ∈ ~s, and dist(~s, t, n + 1) holds if there
is a u with dist(~s, u, n) and {t, u} is guarded. Note that, by this definition, dist describes
“distance at most” rather than “exact distance”.
We write Cut((M,~s), n) for the submodel {t ∈ (M,~s) | dist(~s, t, n)} consisting of all
points t in M lying at distance at most n from s. The following result shows that GF , like
basic modal logic, satisfies a finite depth property, suitably defined:
Lemma 3.24 (Distance-Depth Lemma). Let φ be any guarded formula of depth n, and
let (N,~s) be any submodel of (M,~s) containing all of Cut((M,~s), n). Then (M,~s) |= φ iff
(N,~s) |= φ.
Next comes a generalization of modal bisimulation. A guarded bisimulation is a non-
empty set F of finite partial isomorphisms between two models M and N which has the
following back-and-forth conditions: given any function f : X → Y in F , (i) for all guarded
Z ⊆M , there is a g ∈ F with domain Z such that g and f agree on the intersection X ∩Z,
(ii) for all guarded W ⊆ N , there is a g ∈ F with range W such that the inverses g−1 and
f−1 agree on Y ∩W .
Also, we have “rooted” guarded bisimulations F running between models (M,s1, . . . , sn)
and (N, t1, . . . , tn) with given initial objects, where one requires that {(si, ti) | 1 ≤ i ≤ n}
is a partial isomorphism in F . By a simple inductive argument, one then shows:
Fact 3.25. GF -formulas are invariant for rooted guarded bisimulations: whenever there is
a rooted guarded bisimulation between models (M,s1, . . . , sn) and (N, t1, . . . , tn), then for
all GF -formulas φ(x1, . . . , xn), M |= φ [s1, . . . , sn] iff N |= φ [t1, . . . , tn].
Andre´ka, van Benthem and Ne´meti [1] show that, conversely, GF consists, up to logical
equivalence, of just those first-order formulas which are invariant for guarded bisimulations.
Another ‘modal’ use of guarded bisimulation in the same paper is model unraveling.
This is like standard modal unraveling, but the construction is a bit more delicate:
Definition 3.26 (Tree unravelings for GF). Let M be any model. A guarded path will
be a non-empty finite sequence of guarded sets in M . We say that an element of M is
active in a guarded path π = 〈S1, . . . , Sn〉 if it belongs to Sn and not to Sn−1 (or n = 1),
and passive if it belongs to both Sn and Sn−1. The intuition is when an element occurs
actively, a new copy is created in the unraveling, whereas when it occurs passively, the
previous copy is used. Correspondingly, let ≡ be the equivalence relation generated by
(π1, d) ∼ (π2, d) for π2 a guarded path extending π1 with a single guarded set, and d passive
in π2. Now, the domain of the tree unraveling unrGF (M) consists of all pairs (π, d) where
π is a guarded path and d is active in π, and the interpretation of predicate symbols Q is
as follows. I(Q) contains the tuple 〈(π1, d1), . . . , (πk, dk)〉 if and only if (d1, . . . , dn) belongs
to the interpretation of Q in M , and there is a guarded path π (which will in fact be a
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common extension of π1, . . . , πn), such that d1, . . . , dk all belong to the final set of π, and
(π, di) ∼ (πi, di) for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n.
For a model with parameters (M,~s) this generalizes as follows. unrGF (M,~s) has paths
π all starting from the initial set ~s, but then continuing with guarded sets only. The objects
(π, d) are defined as before.
The point here is that the set F of all restrictions of the finite maps sending (πi, di) to
di for all guarded finite domains in unrGF (M,~s) is a rooted guarded bisimulation between
(M,~s) and unrGF (M,~s). Checking the zigzag conditions for the bisimulation will reveal the
reason for the above definition of the predicate interpretations I(Q). For other, essentially
equivalent formulations of this notion, cf. [1, 11].
Now we have the generalities in place for our Lindstro¨m Theorem, but it remains to
make some adjustments. Firstly, the notion of guarded bisimulation needs to be slightly
adjusted. GFbin-bisimulations are defined like guarded bisimulations, except that the back-
and-forth conditions are only required to hold when X∩Z 6= ∅ and Y ∩W 6= ∅, respectively.
It can be shown that GFbin is precisely the GFbin-bisimulation invariant fragment of FO
(over vocabularies consisting of unary and binary relation symbols only).
Secondly, in the definition of tree unravelings, we make one simple change for the binary
case:
The finite paths of guarded sets always introduce one new object at each
stage. At each step, one takes a new object related to that new object.
This allows paths starting with object a and then continuing with Rab, Qcb, . . . , while
ruling out paths like Rab,Qac. But the final atom is not omitted from the unraveled model,
since one can have paths starting with a and then placing Qac immediately. Thus, even
with these restricted paths, we still have a GFbin-bisimulation between tree unravelings and
their original models. The real point of this adjustment is the following observation:
The definition of predicates for path objects makes binary relations hold only between
objects (π1, d1), (π2, d2) where π2 is a one-step continuation of the path π1, or vice versa.
But then, counting distance as before,
The new object at the end of a path of length k lies at distance k from the
initial object of the path.
Put in more vivid terms, ‘tree distance is true distance’ in the original model. This is
a non-obvious fact. E.g., with ternary guards Rayz, objects at the end of a path may keep
links to the initial object a which might recur at any finite depth in the guarded sets along
the path.3 Having a direct correspondence between the length of the path and the distance
in the tree unraveling is essential, as it will allow us to establish a finite depth property
analogous to Lemma 3.2 for the basic modal language.
We will write unrGFbin(M) and unrGFbin(M,~s) for this new type of unraveling. Now
everything is in place for our final argument:
Proof of Theorem 3.23. Let L be any abstract logic extending GFbin and satisfying Com-
pactness and invariance for GFbin-bisimulations. As before, it suffices to show that every
formula φ ∈ L is invariant for models that are equivalent for all GFbin-formulas up to some
finite depth n.
First, largely as in the earlier modal proof of Sect. 3.1, we use the Compactness of L,
together with its Relativization Closure, to show that φ must have the Finite Occurrence
3This observation is due to Martin Otto, p.c. to the authors.
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Property and a Finite Distance Property for some level n. Before, universal prefix formulas
kp (for all finite k) made sure that p holds in the generated submodel at the current node.
This time, one uses all nested sequences of universal guarded quantifiers up to depth k,
requiring that some new predicate P holds for all objects reached at the end. The n thus
found for the local depth of the formula φ is the same n as needed for the following semantic
invariance:
Given the above unraveling construction and invariance for GFbin-bisimulation for L,
we may then assume, without loss of generality, that we have the following situation:
(a) unrGFbin(M,~s) |= φ
(b) unrGFbin(M,~s) and unrGFbin(N,~t) satisfy the same GFbin-formulas up to depth n
Our aim is to show that (unrGFbin(N,~t)) |= φ.
We start by cutting the tree models to depth n, as before in our modal argument,
obtaining Cut(unrGFbin(M,~s), n) and Cut(unrGFbin(N,~t), n). Since tree depth is true depth,
this does not change truth values of φ in either model.
Then we define a GFbin-bisimulation between these models. First of all, note that all
elements in the first one are of the form (〈{~s}, {d1, d2}, . . . , {dk−1, dk}〉, dk) with d ∈ ~s and
0 ≤ k ≤ n) where each set in the sequence is guarded. Likewise for the second model.
Secondly, note that the only guarded subsets in these models are singleton sets and sets of
the form {(π, d), (〈π, {d, e}〉, e)}. Now, let the relation Z be the set consisting of ({~s}, {~t}),
as well as all sets of pairs
{({(π, d), (π′, d′)), ((〈π, {d, e}〉, e), (〈π′ , {d′, e′}〉, e′))}
with π, π′ sequences of some length k ≤ n for which it holds that, for all i ≤ k, the guarded
sets πi and π
′
i satisfy the same GFbin-formulas of quantifier depth n− i.
It can be shown (the argument involves a case distinction) that Z is aGFbin-bisimulation
between Cut(unrGFbin(M,~s), n) and Cut(unrGFbin(N,~t), n). Hence, the truth of φ transfers
from Cut(unrGFbin(M,~s), n) to Cut(unrGFbin(N,~t), n), and hence to (N,~t).
As indicated, this argument hits a barrier when ternary predicate are allowed, and
hence we leave a similar Lindstro¨m characterization of the full guarded fragment GF as an
open problem. Recently [16], a Lindstro¨m-style characterization was obtained for the full
GF along slightly different lines, by means of adding a further model-theoretic property,
cf. the discussion below.
4. Discussion
To conclude, we identify a few lines of research suggested by our results.
4.1. Charting the landscape of first-order fragments. We have seen how many frag-
ments of first-order logic have Lindstro¨m characterizations, but with very different proof
techniques. ‘Top-down’, we showed how careful coding can get the original proof down to
cover the 3-variable fragment, while ‘bottom up’, we gave a modal technique which lifts to
various richer modal-like extensions.
There are more positive results than we have presented here: e.g., our coding tech-
nique can easily be adapted to the bounded fragment of first-order logic (cf. [19]), showing
that every abstract logic extending the bounded fragment and having Compactness and the
Lo¨wenheim-Skolem property is contained in FO, and hence also the bounded fragment is
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maximal with respect to Compactness, the Lo¨wenheim-Skolem property, and invariance for
generated submodels (a restriction to binary vocabularies is not necessary here).
However, there is also a ‘gap’ between the two proof techniques, and logics like the
2-variable fragment, or modal logic with an added ‘universal modality’ (“true in all nodes,
accessible or not”) pose a challenge. We may need new proof techniques here, or indeed,
a rethinking of what a Lindstro¨m theorem should be in such cases. Recently, Otto and
Piro [16] have characterized modal logic extended with the universal modality as being a
maximal system L with respect to Compactness, invariance for global bisimulations and
also, the Tarski union property (i.e., preservation of L-sentences under limits of chains
of L-elementary embeddings), and similarly for the guarded fragment. Thus, additional
preservation properties may be needed.
4.2. Re-positioning first-order logic in this broader setting. Lindstro¨m’s theorem in
its classical formulation characterizes first-order logic only within the class of its extensions.
A natural question to ask in our wider setting is within which broader classes of languages we
can characterize first-order logic. Our Theorem 2.3 gave a partial answer: it characterized
first-order logic within the class of extensions of FO3. This at once suggests many new
questions. For instance, are there extensions of FO2 not contained in FO that satisfy
Compactness and the Lo¨wenheim-Skolem property? 4
4.3. Down and then up again: adding fixed-point operators. It is well-known that
fragments of first-order logic can behave very differently from the full system when it
comes to adding transitive closure, or even complete fixed-point extensions. In particu-
lar, the modal µ-calculus remains decidable, just like the basic modal logic, whereas the
logic LFP (FO) extending first-order logic with arbitrary fixed-point operators becomes
not recursively enumerable, and indeed Π11 complete. While fixed-point logics of both sorts
are natural from a computational point of view, they have resisted Lindstro¨m-style analysis
so far. Here is one question, out of many which suggest themselves following our earlier
results:
Question 4.1. Can the modal µ-calculus be characterized in terms of bisimulation invari-
ance and the finite model property? 5
4.4. Characterizing logics on specific classes of structures. No Lindstro¨m character-
izations are known for first-order logic on finite structures, or on trees. Compactness fails
for first-order logic on such structures, and, on finite structures, the Lo¨wenheim-Skolem
property becomes meaningless. In this paper, we proved one positive result: we showed
that GML behaves on trees as first-order logic does on arbitrary structures: it is maximal
with respect to Compactness and the Lo¨wenheim-Skolem property. In general, however,
this area remains underexplored: [12] raise the issue of the ‘missing Lindstro¨m theorem’
for finite model theory. Here we state just one related technical question. Given a logic
L interpreted on finite structures and a logic L′ interpreted on arbitrary structures (both
4 Theorem 3.5 gave an extension ofmodal logic not contained in first-order logic which has these properties.
5This formulation naturally arises in our setting since so many of our modal arguments involved finite
reachability of nodes from the origin, a typical non-first-order fixed-point notion.
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satisfying the usual conditions such as closure under the Boolean operations), let us say that
L′ is a conservative extension of L if L is simply the restriction of L′ to finite structures.
Question 4.2. Are there extensions of first-order logic on finite structures that have a con-
servative extension to infinite structures satisfying Compactness and Lo¨wenheim-Skolem?
4.5. Relating different characterizations: the case of interpolation. Finally, taking
stock of our results, there is also the more elusive, but still interesting question of “what
is a Lindstro¨m theorem?”. As we already indicated in the introduction, there are many
natural ways to characterize the expressive power of a logic, including Lindstro¨m theorems,
preservation theorems, and characterizations involving Craig interpolation.
And even the Lindstro¨m theorems in this paper fall into different classes. Some use
Compactness and Lo¨wenheim-Skolem, or some other size-restricting principle of model ex-
istence, while others use Compactness and Invariance for Potential Isomorphisms, or some
other semantic transfer property of the language. While these formulations both capture
first-order logic, we have seen that they diverge for basic modal logic, where we have a char-
acterization of the latter type but not of the former. The precise extent of this phenomenon
remains to be understood.
While the picture of ‘natural properties’ is not quite clear yet, it is noticable that Lind-
stro¨m theorems seem to go hand in hand with interpolation results in abstract model theory
and related areas. Among the proper extensions of FO the main examples of interpolation
are Lω1ω, its countable admissible fragments LA, and second order logic SO. Barwise [3]
gives a maximality characterization of Lω1ω and its countable admissible fragments LA in
terms of a (generalized) recursion theoretic criterion called strict absoluteness. The proof
uses interpolation.6 Also second-order logic has a maximality characterization: SO is the
maximal extension of FO in which every definable model class has a “flat” definition in set
theory [22]. Again this result is intimately connected with the (trivial) way in which SO
satisfies (single-sorted) interpolation. Finally, the interpolation theorem of L∞ω for entail-
ment along potential isomorphism in [2] is related to a maximality characterization of this
logic: L∞ω is the maximal extension of FO which is bounded and has the Karp Property
[4]. We feel that this link between Lindstro¨m theorems and interpolation theorems requires
further analysis.
Moreover, this connection makes sense for our study of fragments as well. Some of
our results used interpolation properties already, and in particular, our paradigmatic modal
logics have them. Indeed, among fragments, even further types of interpolation property
emerge, which fail for first-order logic. Thus, the two major modal logics for which we
managed to obtain Lindstro¨m theorems, namely basic modal logic and graded modal logic,
both possess uniform interpolation, a strong form of Craig interpolation where the inter-
polant can be chosen uniformly for all consequents sharing some specified vocabulary with
the antecedent. We would like to understand the impact of this condition on abstract logics
in conjunction with our Lindstro¨m-style analysis in this paper.
6It is arguable whether this characterization of Lω1ω (or LA) should be considered a Lindstro¨m type
results as strict absoluteness is not a model theoretic condition. However the boundary between generalized
recursion theory and infinitary model theory is not very strict.
LINDSTRO¨M THEOREMS FOR FRAGMENTS OF FIRST-ORDER LOGIC 27
References
[1] Hajnal Andre´ka, Johan van Benthem, and Istva´n Ne´meti. Modal logics and bounded fragments of
predicate logic. Journal of Philosophical Logic, 27(3):217–274, 1998.
[2] Jon Barwise and Johan van Benthem. Interpolation, preservation, and pebble games. J. Symbolic Logic,
64(2):881–903, 1999.
[3] K. Jon Barwise. Absolute logics and L∞ω. Ann. Math. Logic, 4:309–340, 1972.
[4] K. Jon Barwise. Axioms for abstract model theory. Ann. Math. Logic, 7:221–265, 1974.
[5] Patrick Blackburn, Maarten de Rijke, and Yde Venema. Modal logic. Cambridge University Press,
Cambridge, UK, 2001.
[6] Egon Bo¨rger, Erich Gra¨del, and Yuri Gurevich. The Classical Decision Problem. Springer-Verlag, 1997.
[7] Maarten de Rijke. A Lindstro¨m theorem for modal logic. In A. Ponse, M. de Rijke, and Y. Venema, ed-
itors, Modal Logic and Process Algebra: A Bisimulation Perspective, pages 217–230. CSLI Publications,
1995.
[8] Jo¨rg Flum. Characterizing logics. In Jon Barwise and Solomon Feferman, editors, Model-Theoretic
Logics. Springer, 1985.
[9] Gebhard Fuhrken. Skolem-type normal forms for first-order languages with a generalized quantifier.
Fundamenda mathematicae, 54:291–302, 1964.
[10] Marta Garc´ıa-Matos and Jouko Va¨a¨na¨nen. Abstract model theory as a framework for universal logic.
In J.-Y. Beziau, editor, Logica Universalis. Birkha¨user, 2005.
[11] Erich Gra¨del. On the restraining power of guards. Journal of Symbolic Logic, 64(4):1719–1742, 1999.
[12] Phokion G. Kolaitis and Jouko A. Va¨a¨na¨nen. Generalized quantifiers and pebble games on finite struc-
tures. Annals of Pure and Applied Logic, 74(1):23–75, 1995.
[13] Per Lindstro¨m. On extensions of elementary logic. Theoria, 35:1–11, 1969.
[14] Maarten Marx and Yde Venema.Multi-dimensional Modal Logic. Applied Logic Series. Kluwer Academic
Publishers, 1997.
[15] Kan Ching Ng and Alfred Tarski. Relation algebras with transitive closure. Notices of the AMS, 24:A29–
A30, 1977.
[16] Martin Otto and Robert Piro. A Lindstro¨m characterisation of the guarded fragment and of modal
logic with a global modality. In Carlos Areces and Robert Goldblatt, editors, Advances in Modal Logic
7, pages 273–187. College Publications, 2008.
[17] Alfred Tarski and Steven Givant. A Formalization of Set Theory without Variables, volume 41 of Col-
loquium Publications. American Mathematical Society, 1987.
[18] Balder ten Cate. Interpolation for extended modal languages. Journal of Symbolic Logic, 70(1):223–234,
2005.
[19] Balder ten Cate. Model theory for extended modal languages. PhD thesis, University of Amsterdam,
2005. ILLC Dissertation Series DS-2005-01.
[20] Balder ten Cate, Johan van Benthem, and Jouko Va¨a¨na¨nen. Linstro¨m theorems for fragments of first-
order logic. In Proceedings of LICS 2007, pages 280–292. IEEE Computer Society, 2007.
[21] Leslie Tharp. Which logic is the right logic. Synthese, 31:1–21, 1975.
[22] Jouko Va¨a¨na¨nen. Abstract logic and set theory. I. Definability. In Logic Colloquium ’78 (Mons, 1978),
volume 97 of Stud. Logic Foundations Math., pages 391–421. North-Holland, Amsterdam, 1979.
[23] Johan van Benthem. Guards, bounds, and generalized semantics. Journal of Logic, Language, and
Information, 14:263–279, 2005.
[24] Johan van Benthem. A new modal Lindstro¨m theorem. Logica Universalis, 1:125–148, 2007.
[25] Yde Venema. Relational games. In Hajnal Andre´ka, Donald Monk, and Istva´n Ne´meti, editors, Algebraic
Logic, 1991.
This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NoDerivs License. To view
a copy of this license, visit http://reativeommons.org/lienses/by-nd/2.0/ or send a
letter to Creative Commons, 171 Second St, Suite 300, San Francisco, CA 94105, USA, or
Eisenacher Strasse 2, 10777 Berlin, Germany
